Facts on the Ground and A Few Positive Takeaways From our Afghan Exit

Afghanistan proved, once again, to be the “Graveyard of Empires,” as it is commonly known and discussed by Seth Jones in his remarkable book of the same name. We are in line to claim this title as our own just as the Soviet Union did from 1979 to 1989, and the British before them from 1839–1842, as a result of their wars in Afghanistan.

It appears that regardless of whether you came down in favor of, or opposed to, initially going into Afghanistan in 2001, or even of leaving after 20 years; our clumsy withdrawal and evacuation of Kabul pushes us, once again, into the argument. Only a few weeks ago there were women in the streets, uncovered and pursuing commerce, small business, and government. Girls were attending schools and NGO’s were helping with teaching and health care. Except for those scurrying to find their way to the Kabul airport, women have now disappeared from the streets of Kabul and numerous other Afghan Cities out of absolute terror.

Teachers, Afghan doctors and anyone even remotely affiliated with the United States are too afraid to leave their homes and are desperate to escape the country with their families.

The chaos at the Kabul airport is eerily reminiscent of our forces exiting Vietnam and it is disappointing to those of us who feel that we should, in fact, be leaving. We had hoped we had learned to leave on our terms, and not our victor’s. This is undoubtedly disappointing to our allies as well since the Biden Administration is attempting to reassert our country into global affairs in a rational and diplomatic manner. There is also some evidence that our precipitous withdrawal was even somewhat of a surprise for our European allies, leaving them with incomplete and unresolved consequences for their own citizens within Afghanistan. We are all watching in disbelief and incredulity at how poor the planning and logistics have been for this withdrawal. There was even a pause in the exit process due to a failure to prepare enough safe spaces and supplies for those relocating. Serious logistical concerns hadn’t been anticipated and prepared for. We aren’t used to witnessing the United States in this position. Rather than getting easier, the roadblocks and obstacles to the airport may have become even more complicated and treacherous. It is rumored that many Al Qaida and Haqqani network prisoners who were released as the Taliban rampaged through the country as “liberators,” have since been placed as guards around the airport perimeter. When President Biden refers to his “Taliban” liaison and reassures the public that any American or Afghan ally can get to the airport, it seems dubious at best. Reporters and eyewitnesses on the ground have contradicted this since the evacuation has begun. And today, our government is warning Americans NOT to show up at the airport and a set of alternative exit plans are being put in place because of. terror threats to Americans attempting to enter the airport.

I. How did we get here?

Biden’s campaign promises to withdraw from Afghanistan still remained tied to Trump’s timeline and the Trump-Pompeo withdrawal agreement. This has resulted in many of the unfortunate problems occurring during the present evacuation. President Biden extended the date of withdrawal in the agreement by approximately four months, while not challenging other elements of the text. In spite of signaling the departure of our troops; the Biden administration did not begin planning for all individuals in danger to be evacuated early enough, even though there were dire predictions of many, including numerous veterans and lawmakers. At least six weeks earlier, Guam, which had been used as a relocation point for numerous refugees previously, had offered its assistance in the event of an evacuation of Afghanistan,

It is unclear, as well, whether the administration had made any effort to turn around a formal refugee settlement program gutted by Stephen Miller for “racist” reasons, thereby limiting refugees to only 17,000 annually approved as opposed to the 100,000 permitted by law. This has left the Biden administration crippled in assessing those qualified, vetted and permitted to exit the country. This has contributed to much of the panic and fear on the part of Afghans who had been waiting years to have their Visas to be approved.

While “no one” expected the Taliban to make such easy progress taking over the country, this could have been anticipated by taking a closer look at President Ghani’s corruption, which prevented the Afghan Army from being paid for several months. In addition President Ghani specifically asked the Biden administration in June to “slow down” our withdrawal and promised to stay and “die” with his country. When circumstances did not bode in his favor, he escaped into exile. These were two elements leading to the Afghan Army’s disillusionment and total disintegration. Another has to do with the expectation coming from both the Trump and the Biden administrations, that the West was committed to withdrawal, regardless of the circumstances, and this is indeed what occurred. This has nothing to do with the Afghan Armies willingness to battle or the sacrifices previously made against the Taliban. Similar to Vietnam, the local military had to support a corrupt government and ultimately couldn’t.

To be clear, even though the collapse of the Army and takeover of the country

took only 11 days, much faster than many military sources believed could happen; it is also useful to analyze other strategic implications of the Trump administration’s legacy to President Biden in Afghanistan. Namely the drawdown of our military forces to barely 2500 troops. All these factors left the Biden administration on shaky ground when it decided to safely withdraw this summer.

Other factors poisoning our withdrawal were the terms of the superficial agreement which Trump and Pompeio signed in order to justify a hurried exit. It appears that the Trump administration. assumed would occur during his second term. Their agreement completely bypassed both President Chani and the interests of the Afghan Army. Their understanding was that the Taliban would assume power and specifically Mullah Omar’s partner in creating the Taliban, Abdul Ghani Baradar.

President Trump, Pompeiio and their envoy Zalmay Khalilzad. agreed to Taliban demands to have Baradar released from prison in Pakistan to assist in the Trump-Pompeio negotiations knowing full well that the Taliban intended to install him as its political face in Afghanistan once they assumed power. Here again, the terms of this former agreement and the installation of Abdul Chani Baradar ,in power is part of President Biden’s problem. Again ignoring President Chani and the Afghan Army, on which we spent so much time and treasure sent the only signal Ghani and the army needed to insure his flight and the army’s collapse.

Baradar stated upon his entrance into Kabul that the Taliban’s real test was only just beginning and restated his commitment to the country and the women within it, as long as they follow “sharia” law. Of course no one knows what that means precisely, but it has not arrested the fears of women and others in the country. Taliban rule is not inevitable however. The Hazar, the Shiite Muslims, in the northeast and others in the North and in some urban areas have committed themselves to continue a fight with the Taliban. In the short term this will lead to a potential civil war and a defensive Taliban state which leaves the status and free movement of women, teachers, NGOs and others in precarious positions.

Ultimately, Baradar and the Taliban were playing for time, waiting for the Americans to leave and preparing for their final offensive. Baradar and the Taliban return to power is a kind of “back to the future moment.” The time warp reinforces once again the legacy of bloodied empires in a region whose whole history is littered with conflict and death for those within and without., all of which confirms the Graveyard of Empire’s theory and the Afghan ability to play the “long game,” and wait the west out. There is enough blame to go around to every one of the Presidents involved in going into and increasing our presence in Afghanistan. Our departure is no less messy than that the Russian, and others before and it and still leaves Afghanistan as a semi failed state and its people quite vulnerable.

II. What are the Takeaways and Are there Positive Takeaways?

History shows us that It is never easy to end or lose a war and most often it is quite messy. The degree of sloppiness is often unanticipated. Afghanistan is no exception. A failed Afghan government, local rage, a forceful take over, and the. immediate pull out of allied powers has created confusion, instability, panic and a real crisis of confidence on the part of supporters and allies of President Biden. Perhaps some of these concerns can be addressed by the time our troops actually withdraw on August 31 or soon thereafter.

There are positive takeaways from our last twenty years in Afghanistan. Each and every soldier, NGO member, teacher and student should be quite proud. They have built some semblance of governing and educational institutions during their time there. They have contributed to the overall development and maintenance of civil society, buildings, computer businesses and commercial industries. Whether or not we initially wanted to conduct “nation building,” we nevertheless did. Schools, roads, hospitals, and an infrastructure of institutions within Afghanistan were built. This was often done outside of the framework of the formal and corrupt Afghan government. Afghanistan and the Afghani people have changed. Perhaps this will impact the Taliban leaders and influence their actions. The degree to which some or all of the institutions creating during the past twenty years will remain, may determine the future of the country, even under Taliban rule. Those Taliban leaders who spent most of the last 20 years ghosting Afghanistan while holed up in luxury in the Gulf in Doha, Qatar, perhaps realize that they must govern and take care of sewage, electricity, education and development of a country of 36 million. Their previous chaotic rule focusing on infighting, fighting the infidels and ritual purity will not serve them well running a government and developing either unilateral or multi lateral agreements. They are going to need money, assistance, engineers and more, meaning cooperation from other nations. They must look to gain financial independence from something other than opium and gain an understanding of the need to compromise. For this, they will need tolerance. Perhaps, like nations in the Gulf, the Taliban will begin to view or at least treat women and their activities as something other than unseen and unheard from, a. role developed and subsequently evolved from centuries ago. Perhaps they will have observed enough of a kind of “liberal” functioning religious Muslim country that may even lead in some small measure to the art of compromise and tolerance.

III. Conclusions

Few Americans really want to remain in Afghanistan and after twenty years most agree that withdrawal is indeed the right direction and as President Biden reaffirmed, “We don’t want to hand Afghanistan and the loss of one more American life to the next president” Whether a temporary force should have remained, or we should have begun withdrawal of insecure Afghan populations sooner; what we know now, once again, is that losing and extricating from a war is difficult. We can indeed say that we have improved on our departure from Vietnam. As of this evening, August 22, we have successfully evacuated at least x thousand and have at least 6 more days to move even more beyond the Afghan borders.

To those who have committed themselves to rebuilding a totally broken-down country and staying in country to participate and continue their work under the Taliban, NGO’s, Media personnel and others, we commend them and pray for their safety. On the question of diplomacy with the Taliban, China is poised to exchange money for rare earth minerals as they have done around the world. These relationships appear to be transactional and the receiving country rarely develops too much dependency on China . Nevertheless, Chinese involvement, will be sufficiently interesting to us in the context of great power rivalries, to keep the United States and Russia interested on the periphery. As long as our objectives are achieved which remain, little or no terrorism emanating out of the country, safe passage for allies and the no extreme deterioration in the safety of women and outsiders,, our exit from Afghanistan is completely. Whether the Taliban can expect diplomatic recognition and assistance from many countries in the West remains to be seen.